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Following is agreed Working Group text of Report to MG, which will be made to the Council on April 25 by the WK Texas Representative on behalf of the four powers:

I. TROUGHT OF

As was made clear in the statement of the four Poreign Ministers to the Council of April 2, the Working Group we structed to prepare as far as possible an agreed position testical plan for negotiations with the U.S.S.R. for the s sideration of the four Foreign Winisters at their next s on April 29. In their work they have also had the the useful paper produced by the W.A.T.O. Secretories beauting "Ligest of beervations Helating to Negettatio the U.S.B. K.".

2. Assordingly, the Group have drawn up a phased of German reunification and Guropean scennity and distribution plan is conceived as a whole, That is to say, it's soluble package. If the foriet Covernment were to cortain elements in this package should be extracted into a separate agreement or if they were to suggest process involved in the plan should be suspended at point, the Ventern Powers would refuse, explaining the conted before the process could begine

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Secretary Amenbassiss Bown, Memors, and Paris; USBER Boylin

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OFRIAN REUNIFICATION

- 3. As regards the method of reunification, the Working Group has pro-
 - (a) the West should make new and more realistic proposals to the Soviet Union than those which were put forward at the Geneva Conference of 1955;
 - (b) such proposals might be rejected by the Soviet Union but even so they should be calculated to appeal to public opinion both in the Western and in the uncommitted countries.
- 4. In formulating such proposals, the Working Group has kept in wind the demands of the Soviet Government. So far as reunification is concerned, the Soviet position has been this:
 - (a) rounification is a matter for the Cormans themselves;
 - (b) It should be brought about by a repprochament and megatistions between the two German states;
 - the "D.D.R." should not be ortwoted, and negotiations should therefore take place only on the basis of parity; free elections are to be rejected, at least until the very end of the reunification process;
 - (d) the "social achievements" (meaning communism) of the "D.D.R." should be preserved.
- 5. As against the Soviet position, the fundamental Western principles for reunification are those:
 - (a) Four Power responsibility, as admitted by the Soviet Union in the directive agreed at the Geneva Summit Conference of 1985;
 - (b) non-recognition of the "D.D.R.";
 - (e) the necessity for holding free elections at some stage in the process of German reunification in order to obtain an all-German Government representing the German people as a whole.
- o, the Working Group believe that it is possible to go some way to uset the Soviet principles without abandoning the Western principles are accepted, the Westing Group consider that the following concessions could be used:

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- (a) a greater degree of German participation in the process;
- (b) a mixed German Counittee, including delegates both from the Federal Republic and the "D.D.R." might be set up at an early stage in the reunification process without any recognition of the "D.D.R." as a state;
- (e) such a Mimed Committee would operate during the transitional period before all-German elections. It should be constituted so that the "D.D.R." representatives could not be out-voted, although the "D.D.R." would not of course be represented on the principle of parity. The terms of reference of the Committee would be to make proposals for the improvement of technical contacts and freedom of movement between the two parts of Germany and possibly in connection with human rights;
- (d) at the end of the transitional poriod there would be free all-
- V. Once free elections had been held for an all-German National Assembly, the rest of the process would develop on the general lines set out in the proposals made at the Geneva Conference of 1955.
- The Restorm proposals about reunification work a fundamental change in our ideas. They excets, in effect, an intermediate stage during which important concessions are made to the Soviet theses. If this informediate stage were to be prolonged, in fact, there would be a rick that the Residence would gain their end. It therefore seems impossible in discuss these proposals if the Soviets refuse to eccept the principle of the selections, a principle which is in any case difficult for this to reject completely. But the introduction of the intermediate stage should greatly help them to accept the principle. This ensures the question posed by the Secretary Geneval of N.A.T.O. at the Rashington and that

STUDIES HEARING IN BUROPE AND DESARVAURIES

- the hadicated in the report of the four Poreign Ministers of April 2, the hading Group have studied how progress in the security field enaid in limited to, and proceed in step with, progress towards the reunifleen tion of Germany.
- lo. In the phased plan for Common tennification, the first step would be declaratory, the second stage would precede rounification and the third stage would fellow pounification.

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Il. Proceeding from the above, and relating proposals about European security to the phases proposed for German reunification, the Working Group envisage that Stage I should be mainly declaratory. Thus, in a common declaration, to which they could invite other interested European states to associate themselves, the Four Powers could undertake to:-


- (a) settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they might be involved with any other party;
- (b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (e) withhold assistance to an aggressor.

that is to say the stage when German reunification would be accomplished, the objections to an area of limitation of forces in Europe would have been greatly lessened. Accordingly, it is considered that Stage II would be the appropriate time at which to work out the controls and inspection procedures which would become operative in Stage III. Furthermore, the Four Fowers might undertake at this stage to exchange information about military forces in an European area to be determined. It is propriately undertaken in Stage II. Such measures would have to be accompanied by a provision for inspection.

15. The question of measures against surprise attack is a difficult one and final proposals which could be put to the Soviet Government are still under diseassion. The principles which have to be harmonised are those se

- (a) militarily restricted somes of measures against surprise attack are of little or no value. At a time when missiles can be shot for thousands of miles, it may be doubted whether enything very much short of a global system has military significance;
- therefore the question has to be considered in a political light. But, in so far as proposals of this kind may be aty tractive to the Soviet Government, this may well be because the Soviet Government judge that such proposals present them with an opportunity to press for the development of some of inspection against surprise attack into somes of a different character. The danger which has to be guarded against is that somes of inspection against surprise attack might develop into somes of limitation, which could not be accepted

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at any rate in the period prior to German rounification. As the Recretariat's paper says, it is necessary to beware against creating a false impression of security.

- (e) In this connection a further concern of the Working Group has been to consider the possibility of some proposal at this stage of the plan which would have not only an appeal to public opinion in general but which would have the particular effect of giving the Western Powers something positive to offer.
- 14. As regards Stage III, the stage after the acid evement of German reunification, the working Group consider that agreed force ceilings could/be stablished. Of course, so ething of this kind would be facilitated by a measure of progress on general disarrament. Furthermore, an undertaking could be given that, after the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty, no party should station forces in any country in the agreed area without the consent of the country involved. Upon the sequest of that country, the parties to the agreement woul undertake to eithdress their forces within a stated period.
- 18. Should the all-derman Government decide to adhere to any collective security past should they, for instance, decide to join NATO the Four Four security arrangements to join with the other parties to the massopean security arrangements in giving an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of decarration between the two parts of Germany.
- the Newking Group was also instructed to study the question of the consistion to be established between general disarrament and proposals for the remification of Germany. On the one hand, as stated above, progress in the field of general disarrament could clearly facilitate progress in the field of German reunification and European security. Generally, political progress could facilitate progress with general disarrament. The problem remains under study.

We the Western Powers have undertaken to discuss at Geneva the German sensetion including Berlin and a German Pence Treaty. Although they consider discussion of a German Peace Trouty premature, since such fines breaty can in their view only be concluded with an all-German Genevament, they cannot themselves refuse discussion altogether, evil all they do is listen to the Soviet proposals. In some respectable, so said that the essentials of a German Pence Treaty already calls so far as the Security proposals which the Western Powers would be seen at the Conference could appropriately be embodied in such a fracty. Indeed, it has been suggested that a Pence Treaty is superfineds

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However, the insistence of the Soviet Union of a Peace Treaty and the terms of the Western notes of March 26 make it difficult for the Western Powers to avoid discussion.


18. In the circumstances, the quastion arises how far the Castern Powers should go in discussion, bearing always in mind that they must reserve the position of an all-German Government. This is a tactical question which it will probably be possible only to resolve in the course of megetiation at the Conference. The Working Group consider that it will be prudent for the mestern Powers to have available the principles of a sease Treaty which they can table at the Conference if that proves necessary. Their present view is that it would probably be a mistake for the Western Powers to go further than this and to table the draft of a sease Treaty.

19. Should negotiation of a feace Ireaty become a serious possibility, it will of course be necessary to consult other interested countries, including, at the appropriate stage after the formation of an all-German Government, all the states which were at war with Gormany.

20. The Working Group is in agreement with the views expressed about Berlin in the Secretariat's paper. These views are reflected in the plans which the Working Group have made for dealing with this question in the forthcoming negotiations. The Council will however understand that the question of the moment at which any particular set of proposals should be put to the Hussians is constictly one of tactics and therefore not an appropriate subject for elaboration now.

Conference, the Working Group considers that reference to Berlin should be made in conjunction with the "phased plan." There is some danger in including proposals regarding Borlin in the phased plan itself because, if the plan is rejected as a whole and an interim Berlin solution has to be negotiated separately, the Soviet Government may conclude that items other than Berlin can also be extracted from the "package" for separate consideration. It might therefore be possible to suggest that, since the "phased plan" envisages the rounification of Germany in less than three years and the consequent restoration of Berlin as the capital of a semified Germany, the Four Powers should simply agree that during this interim period they will not alter the existing arrangements regarding Berlin and access thereto. The Working Group considers, however, that the Western Powers ought, if possible, to go further than this and make some positive proposals which would be regarded as constructive by public opinion. In this connection the Working Group have considered the possibility of proposing an all-Berlin sclution and, alternatively, the possibility of offering the Bussians some satisfaction regarding specific points about which they have complained.

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22. The Council will understand why it is impossible to elaborate in any detail a tactical plan for the conduct of the negotiations. The main reason is that most of the tactical questions which will arise at a conference can only be settled by the bestern foreign finisters during the Conference itself and in the light of the negotiations as they develop. On the other hand, the working Group believe that the Council should be aware in general terms of some of the tactical problems which will have to be faced and the considerations which the Working Group believe must be borne in mind.


23. One problem which will probably arise at the outset of a conference is that of its ecaposition. The Working Group consider that the Western representatives should be guided by the following goneiderations:

- (a) the desirability of maintaining the basis of Four Power responsibility on German questions;
- (b) the undesirability of coding to the Soviet Government the principle of parity;
- (c) the need to onsure that the negotiations do not break down on procedural grounds.

ern representatives will be a serious negotiation leading to an agreement with the Soviet Covernment which will avert the immediate threat to berlin without jeopardising the essential principles of Western policy. The Soviet Covernment will certainly propose discussion of the problems of Berlin and a feace fronty on the grounds that these problems are ripe for solution. The Vestern Powers will thus be faced with a number of serious tactical questions. They will have to decide whether to hear the Soviet arguments first and then refute them or whether to put forward the Western comprehensive plan in order to take the offensive. They must also determine whether and at what state it would be advantageous to engage in a separate discussion of an interim solution for werlin, without prejudicing their fundamental position that a purmanent solution of the Berlin problem can only be achieved by an allegement settlement.

25. In general, the Working Group accept the argument that, in seeking to achieve a serious negotiation, the Western representatives should think, not so such in terms of concessions and "fall-back positions," as in terms of an area of negotiation in which they may hope to improve their position. While it would be a mistake to be optimistic about the

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outcome of the Conference, it would be equally wrong to assume that it is foredoomed to feilure. Although Khrushchev has indicated that major declaions can be taken only by Heads of Covernment at a Summit Conference, he can scarcely believe that a complete failure of the Poreign Ministers' Conference as a result of Soviet intransigence will improve the prospects of a subsequent Summit meeting.

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